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Summary  findings
Solimano  and Yuravlivker  emp.-ically  explore the  suipply  andl  their effect  on the rate of inflation  and rthe
inflationary  process  in Hungary. U;ing  monthly  data,  level  of the real exchange  ratc.  They findl  that a role ot
they provide econometric  estimates of the  etetrininaints  fixing the excoange rate centails  a lower level of (:II
of inflation for 1990-92.  inflation  --  .5  percentage  points Itss of ( Tl inflation  a
Empirical  estimates  of price  equations  - both  year  - than if the rule is based only  oti reluCitleng  tie  ralte
consumer  price index (CPI)  and producer price index  of moncey  growth (to I percent a monith).
(PPI) - show the exchange rate's quantitative  Bliut  a fixed exchange rate policy is associated witli
impor:ance  and statistical  significance  in price formation  greater  appreciationi  of the real exchange  rate tlhatn  is the
in Hungary  during the period of intensified  reform  as the  policy  of money-based  disinflation  - nearly  4
economy  became  more open to international  trade in  percen.age  points more real appreciation  a year.  A PlPll-
both inputs and final goods.  based  exchange  rate rule stabilizes  the real exclhange  rate
Their estimates  show that the money supply  affects  at the cost ot a substan-tial  acceleration  in inflationi.
consumer  and  producer prices with several  lags;  its  These exercises  ililistrate  the nature and magnittide  ot
impact on prices is small  in the short run. Nominal  wages  the tradeoffs  between  faster disinflation  and the level  of
have a more significant  effect  on the CPI than en the  eyrPrnil  roirpnt¶ttiiveness  in an opern  economy  such as
PPI.  Hunigary  that uses  the exchange  raIte  as a nxominl.l  anchor
Solimano  and Yuravlivker  present policy  simulations  of  in disinflationi.
alternative  rules for the exchange  rate and the money
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i1. IntroducQon,
Economic stability is a key pre requisite for further progress in structural
transformation  in transition economies. Low and predictable inflation is important  to assure
that market signals do convey relevant economie  informaticn on relative scarcities  in the
economy  so to properly guide resource allocation  decisions. Moreover, recent research is
showing  a high sensitivity of investment to different measures of economic instability,  chiefly
the rate of inflation'.  Then  not only static resource allocation but also capital formation  and
growth can be adversely affected by inflation. In this perspective, a better understanding  of
the nature of the inflationary  process and the policy choices to reduce and stabilize inflation
is an area of great policy relevance.  Further, in economies increasingly  integrated to world
markets in trade of both final goods and intermediate  inputs, the use of the nominal  exchange
rate for anti-stabilization  purposes has also an impact on izlternr. -?  competitiveness  that
needs to be carefully considered.
In the group of countries undertaking  post-socialist  transitions, Hungary stands  out as
one with a relatively long traditicn in economic reform, which adopted a gradual approach,
and where large macroeconomic  imbalances  and rampant inflation have been avoided. 2 II.
contrast to other countries in Cie region, in Hungary the acceleration of the reform process
after the political change of the late 1980s  has been accompanied  by moderate  inflation:  in
the last four years, the CPI increased by an annual average of 25 percent.  On the
' See Pindyck and Solimano (1993).
2 Of course, historically that was not always the case.  Hungary had hyperinflation  both
in 1923  and in 1946. The latter one was one of the most virulent in recent economic  history
(See Solimano, 1991).stabilizztion  front, the problem of Hungary is how to converge to lower inflation levels (10-
15 percent per year? below 10 percent? ) without hampering other objectives of economic
policy, like the resumption of growth, and the maintenance  of external competitiveness.
This paper investigates  the process of price formation in Hungary and evaluates  the
use of different nominal anchors for disinflation. It provides orders of magnitude  of the
trade-offs  between inflation and the real exchange rate during the course of stabilization
under alternative  monetary and exchange rate policy rules.  The paper is organized as
follows: section  2 provides a background on recent economic developments in Hungary.
Section 3 sets-up  a simple model of inflation determination  in which both aggregate demand
and aggregate  supply factors interact to determine the rate of inflation.  In section 4, the
model is estimated econoinetrically  using 1990-1992  monthly data of consumer  -ices (CPI),
producer prices (PPI), wages, the exchange rate, international  prices and money.  This
sample covers the most critical trandition  period.  In section 5, the econumetric estimates  are
used to simulate  the following  policy alternatives: (1) a policy of fixing the exchange rate;
(2) a policy of reducing the rate of growth of the money supply; (3) a combined policy of
frixing  the exchange  rate with reducing the rate of money growth; (4) a PPP (Purchasing
Power Parity) based exchange rate policy.  These policies are evaluated in terms of two
criteria: (a) impact on inflation and (b) effects on the reai exchange rate.  Finally, section 6
includes some  concluding remarks.
22. Backgrgund,  Main Macroeconomi Developments  in Hungary.
Hungary was the first COMECON country to start moving  away from rigid central
planning  as early as the 1960s. The reform process started with the adoption of the New
Economic  Policy in 1968 and was n^ver fully reversed, as happened for instance, in post-
1968 Czechoslovakda. Despite  periods of some back-tracking, particularly in the mid-1970s,
'reform communism' allowed Hungary much more time to develop practices and attitudes
conducive  to the functioning  of markets than other countries in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union.  Vhile the journey toward private ownership, hard budget constraints,
and free markets and prices started in earnest only in the mid-1980s, two decad^s of
experimentation  with market socialism did prepare the ground.
In the second half of the 1980s, expanding domestic demand and exports surpluses  in
non-,convertible  trade werm  accompanied  by declining convertible  ex  ,rts.  Relaxation of
restrictions  on foreign exchange purchases for travel purposes led to substantial  capital
outflows.  These factors, together with increasing interest payments, resulted in a sharp
deterioiation of the current account in convertible currencies and to a severe foreign
exchange liquidity crisis.
The democratic Government  elected in May 1990 responded forcefully to the crisis by
implementing  a stabilization  and structural adjustment program that was supported by the
IMF and the World Bank.  A key element of the program were periodic adjustments of the
exchange  rate to enharce the international competitiveness  of Hungarian  exports while
preventing  an inflationary spiral.  The Government's strategy aimed at complementing
macroeconomic  stabilization  with a program of systemic transformaticn  to a full-fledged
3mArket  economy through liberalizing  extemal trade and decontrolling prices, privatizing
state-owned  enterprises, encouraging  the development of the private sector, and establishing  a
liberd4  C  rvironment for foreign investment.
The stabilization program oi 1990-91 was very successful in tuming around the
current  account  of the balance of payments  from a deficit of nearly $1.5 billion in 1989 to a
surplus  of $123 million in 1990 and about $300 million per year in 1991-92 (Table 1).  This
adjustment  was achieved  despite unfavorable  external shocks, including probably the worst
drought  this century, the unexpected  shortfall in Soviet oil deliveries, higher energy prices
resulting from the Gulf crisis and the collapse of CMEA trade.  As the CMEA collapsed,
exports  were successfully edirected to western markets and the country keDpt  currrnt on all
its external debt obligations.  The situation  stabilized, Hungary's access to international  bond
markets greatly improved and the country attacted over one-half c  f the total direct foreign
investment  provided to Central and Eastern Europe in 1991-92.  After a slow start, foreign
capital inflows accelerated rapidly in 1991, spurred by a rapid growth of direct foreign
investment  that amounted to nearly US$1.5 billion in each of the last two years.  As a result,
intenational reserves surpassed US$5 billion by the end of 1992, equivalent  to about six
months of imports.
4TABLE 1
HUNGARY:  SELECTED  )ECONOMIC  INDICATORS
i989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Prel.  Proj.
r;  ''  n7rowth  0.4  -3.3  -10.2  -4.5  -2.0
(an val change. %)
o/w indutiai  prduction  -2.0  -7.7  .16.7  -10.0  2.0
hxpotu  ONFS (volume  indices)  1.2  -2.7  -8.7  4.7  -10.0
Imporu  GNFS (volume indices)  1.8  -4.6  -7.7  -4.1  2.0
Cu..t  Account
(million  dolls)  .1438  123  267  314  -1;00 -
(% of GDP)  -4.9  fl.4  0.b  0.9  4.5
Direec  Forcign Investmnent
(million  dollan)  187  311  1459  1415  1300
Consolida  state  budget
(% of CDP)  -1.3  -0.1  -4.5  -7.6  -7.0
CPI  17.0  28.9  35.0  23.0  2-24
(annual  Mte of change, %)
PPI (avenge)  15.4  22.0  32.6  11.5  10-12
(annual  mte of change, %)
NomiMua  devaluation  22.0  5.0  22.0  5.5
(ate of c'ange, %)
The impact of external shocks and domestic reform on aggregate economic  activity
has been severe: measured GDP has contractec.  'y  a cumulative 18 percent between 1989  and
1992, reflecting the collapse of CMEA trade, the restrictive impact of stabilization  po!icies
on domestic  demand and the falling output in the SOE (State-Owned Enterprise) sector.
Production  in both industry and agriculture declined by 30-35%, while the rate of consumer
price inflation  accelerated and peaked at 35% in 1991, declining thereafter to 23% in 1992.'
3  See Solimano (1993a) and (1993b) for a comparative analysis of output behavior
during the post-socialist  transitions.
5As a result of the recession, unemployment  increased rapidly to over 12 perceia of the labor
force by end-1992.
The continuous  recession led to a rapidly deteriorating  fiscal situation.  On the
revenue side, tax receipts fell short of expectation! as the drop Ln output was larger than
expected, the SOE tax base continued to shrink, and the Gover- rent was unable to collect
efficiently  from the -,xpanding  private sector.  On the expenditure side, the rapid hicrease  in
the number of both unemployment  claims and social assistance requests exerted powerful
upward pressures, which have been difficult to resist in the absence of a sharp curtailment  in
the acquired rights of sorme  social security recipients. Thus, the consolidated  state budgct
deficit increased to 4.5% of GDP in 1991  - more than twice the projected level-  and again
to 7% of GDP in 1992.  This levels of the fiscal deficits are certainly incompatible  with a
low inflaton rate in the long run.  'However, in the short to medium
6FIGURE 1
HUNGARY: NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE AND PRICE INDICES
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7term the government has resorted to noninflationary means of financing. In fact, the
Government  was able to finance these large deficits mostly by borr3wing from domestic
commercial  banics,  which captured the rapidly growing household savings. Thus, the fiscal
deficits were financed without increasing  foreign indebtedness  or exacerbating  inflationary
pressures.
Preliminary  data for the first half of 1993 indicates that economic  activity has
continued on its downward  treid.  Industrial  production and sales were roughly stagnant
compared .o the same period last year, although several branches 'e.g.,  basic metals,
machinery  and equipment) show growth rates of 10-15%.  rie  agricultural sector, however,
is in a state of flux following  the severe c ought and the ongoing changes in ownership
structure.  Consumer price increases reflect the two-step hike in the minimum  VAT rate
from 0 to 10%, and expectations  for a decline in the 1993 rate of inflation may not
materialize.
The objective of reducing inflation led to a slowdown in the rate of devaluation  in late
1992 and early 1993, which, along with sizeable capital inflows, produced an appreciation  of
the real exchange rate.  Partly as a result of this appreciation and partly because of lagged
adjustment  to the collapse of CMEA trade and the recession in Western countries, exports
declined  sharply in the first half of 1993. ii.erchandise exports fell by about 30%, and the
resulting  trade deficit was over $2 billion, compared to $275 million  in the corresponding
period last year.  The NBH has reacted to these developments by accelerting  the rate of
mini-devaLuations  since the second quarter of 1993 with potential inflationary  consequences
operating  directly through the cost of imported goods and inputs and indirectly through wage
8increases  via de facto indexation  mechanisms. Thus, the dilemma of choosing the
appropriate  monetary and exchange rate nolicy to lower inflation and maintain  international
competitiveness  is more relevant than ever before.
Exchange  Rate Policy, Inflatign and the Real Exchange Rata
Until December 1991, Hungary pegged its exchange rate to a basket of 11 currencies,
with annually  adjusted weights to reflect the direction of foreign trade.  Then the peg
changed to a basket with weights of one-half USS dollar and one-half ECU.  Finally, on
August '993 it switched the peg to one-half US dollar and one-half DM.  In all cases, it
followed  a policy of mini-devaluation  to compensate  for the inflation differential between
domestic  and foreign prices.  In addition, in setting the rate of devaluation,  important
considerations  have been the level of international  reserves and the size of capital inflows  as
was the case in several Latin-American  countries pursuing crawling-peg  policies in the
1970s.'
The need for exchange rate adjustment,  particularly in the last two years, was greatiy
affected by cross-currencies fluctuations:  as the dollar weakened in early 1992, it led to an
effective  depreciation of tde forint since the acthal share of US dollar trade is lower than
one-half,  thereby reducing the need for a larger devaluation. 5 In addition, facing rising
4See  Yuravlivker (1985).
5  The pattem of devaluations  in last four years has been the following: 22% in 3 steps in
1989, 5% in 2 steps in  1990, 22%  in 2 steps in  1991, and 5.5%  in 3 steps in  1992.  The
sharp drop in exports  since late  1992 has led the National  Bank to devalue 5 times in  1993
by an accumulated 14% during the first 9 months of this year.
9inflation rates in 1992, the authorities slowed the pace of devaluztions  fearing the potential
impact on prices.
The real effective exchange rate (REER) depreciated from 1985 to 1989 and
appreciated thereafter.  The magnitudes  of the changes depend on the definition: deflating  by
the PPI, the REER depreciated  by 25% in 1985-92 but appreciated by 11% in the second
part  of that  period  (1989-92). Using the industral unit labor  cost as deflator,  it depreiated
by 5% in 1985-92  and appreciated by 23% since 1989. With the CPI, the magnitudes  are
similar to the latter.
The evolution of inflation in Hungary in the last few years reflect the effect of
changes in 'fundamentals' and one-time price shocks.  The introduction  of the VAT and
some price deregulation  undertaken  in 1988 was accompanied  by an increase in CPI inflation
from one-digit  level to 16-17% per year in 1988-89. A jump to a second step - 29%  in
1990 and 35% in 1991  resulted from the extensive liberalization of prices', the reduction
in subsidies, higher excises taxes and acceleration  in the rate of devaluation (see below). An
inLeresting  fact of the dynamics  of inflation in Hungary is that the Producer Price Index
lagged consistently  behind consumer prices in the period 1989-1992. In 1992 the rate  of
change of the PPI was only half as high as the rate of change of the CPI.  The faster
increase in consumer prices than producer prices is a similar phenomenon  to other transition
economies,  may reflect declining consumer subsidies, increasing retail mark-ups and growing
prices of services.  The relatively large fiscal deficits in 1992-93 were not a major factor in
I By end-1991, nearly 90% of consumer prices were market determined, compared to
just over 50% in 1985.
10the inflationary  proc4ss since the government  was able to finance them by issuing internal
debt acquired through private savings channeled through the banking system rather than by
resorting to the use of the inflation-tax. A more systematic  attempt at modelling  and
estimating inflation equations  in Hungary is carried-out in the next two sections.
3.  A Simple Model of Inflation.
Modelling  price formation in a transition economy like Hungary is not an easy task.
Transition economics  are a blend of different sentors with different behavioral rules. Firms in
the state sector may follow mark-up pricing while private firms operating in competitive
markets may be price-takers.  At the empirical level, the estimation  of price equations  or
other models face the difficulty  that the structure of the economy  is changing in the transition
period.  Fortunately, a sample that reflects a period, where a dominant  proportion of prices
are free (market-determined)  is already available at a monthly frequency for prices, wages,
the exchange rate and money7.
A Model of Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply.
At conceptual level, a basic distinction to be made is between aggregate demand and
aggregate supply.  The uzaditional  socialist economies were economies  that operated in
conditions of permanient  excess de.mrand  e.g. the a  Shortage economy"', in which most
markets operated as "sellers markets".  The lack of operation of the price system, the
7  Because  of the limited observations, estimating models with annual data will include
both the structure of the socialist  period and the transition one.
'See  Kornai (1980, 1991).
11tendency for the enterpiise sector to operate with "soft'  budget constraints, and the existence
of a built-in "investment-hunger"  by managers and planners generated, at an aggregated
level, chronic excess demand in the economy.  These disequilibria, in turn, showed-up  as
shortages  of final products and inputs, queues, black markets, low quality products and
forced substitution  of final goods by consumers and inputs by producers.
The post-socialist  transition changed the picture.  One view is that restrictive demand
policies  and the ensuing 'transformational recession" have shifted the r  iegime from
excess demand and shortages in which output was suppIX  determined  (c  rce
constrained)  to a regime in which output was dmand  determined 9  On thc *  - hand,
since the transition renders a part of the existing capital stock economically  obsolete, the
supply  side could still be a binding constraint to output expansion in the medium run.  Thus,
in our framework, the price level (or the rate of inflation) and aggregate output (or the rate
of GDP growth) are both iointly determined  by the interplay of aggregate  demand factors
(money, fiscal variables, the exchange rate) and aggregate supply factors (wages, the local
price of imported inputs which in turn depends upon the exchange rate, the rate of
productivity  growth).  Let us turn now to the main building blocks of our model.
A-rate  supply.
Let us assume that the ecoromy has an aggregate production function, F(.), in three
factors: labor, L, imported intermediate  inputs, IM, and physical capital, K.
(1)  Y =  F (L,IM, K)
9  Kornai (1993) argues that in the post-socialist tiansitions suffering  a "transformational
recession" the economy shifted from being "resource (supply) constrained" to be "demand
constrained".
12Assuming  cost-minimization,  the demand for labor will be a function of the real
wage, W/P,  and the price of imported intermediate  inputs EPn*/P and the capital stock,
which  is assumed to be a fixed factor.
(2) L=  L(W/P, EPnJ/P, K)
The demand for imported intermediate  inputs is a function of the relative price of imported
inputs, EPn/P,  where E is the nominal  exchange  rate, Pn,  is the international  price of
imported  inputs and P is the local price level.  The relative price of imported goods thus
defined is also the real exchange rate.
(3) IM =[M( EPn'/P, W/P, K)
Replacing  equations (3) and (2) in (1) we get the aggregate supply function, Ys,(e is a
supply shift factor)
(4) Ys =  Ys(W/P, EPn*/P, K, e)
Tne level of aggregate output will be a negative function of the real wage and the
real price of imported inputs'°.
Aggregate  demand
Aggregate demand, Yd, is equal to the sum of private consumption, C, total
investment,  I, goverrnment  consumption,  G, exports, X, minus imports, M.
(5)Yd  =  C  +  I  +  G  +  X-M
10  We assume, for simplicity, that there is no change in relative prices in dollars between
intermediate  inputs and an average basket of tradable final goods.  The model can be easily
expanded  to include a more realistic differentiation  between the prices of imported materials
and energy and the price index of all traded goods.
13Assuming  that consumption  is a function of disposable income", investment depends
on the real interest rate or directly on the stock of real balances (or credit) and that exports
and imports depend on the real exchange rate, domestic  output and foreign output, Y*.
Assuming  equilibrium  in the money market (the real interest rate can be expressed as a
function of the stock of real balances and the level of income) we can  Arrite:
(6) Yd - Yd( M/P, Z, EP'/P,  Y,  v)
where Z is a vector of fiscal variables, Z={  G, t} comprising governrent  consumption,  0,
and taxes, t, and v is a demand shift factor. Aggr.;ate  demand will be a positive function  of
the stock of real balances, the real exchange rate, (assuming  the tievaluation  is
expansionary),  the level of public consumption  and foreign income. In turn, output demanded
will be a negative function of taxes.
Figure 2 shows the macroeconomic  equilibrium  of the system as represented by the
intersection  of the upward sloping aggregate supply (AS) and the downward sloping
aggregate  demand (AD) schedules  where the vertica axis measures  the price level, P, and
the horizontal  axis the level of GDP, Y. In equilibrium, aggregate demand is equal to
aggregate  supply and that determines the price level and the level of real GDP for given
values of M, E, W and other shifting parameters of the demand and supply functions. 12:
(7)  Ys( W/P, EPn/P,  K, e) =  Yd( M/P, Z, EP/P,  Y',  v)
" It also could be made a function of the level of real wealth.
12  As Bruno  (1992) argues the model will need to incorporate two additional equations  to
determine endogenously  the three relative prices of the system: W/P, EP/P  and M/P. One
possibility  suggested is to incorporate the net excess for labor (a labor market) and the net
flow excess demand for foreign exchange (the current account of the balance of payments).
14Solving  for the price level we get:
(8)  P  = P( W, E, M, q)
In this specification  the price level depends both on demand and supply factors, like
nominal wages, the nominal  exchange rate, the nominal money supply. In turn, the factor q
includes all the other constants  appearing in equation (7). Expressing  equation (8) in rates of
growth form we obtain the following  inflation equation:"
(9)  X =  6P/P =  a GWAGE+ b(GE + GP1+  c GM +  v
This equation shows that the rate of inflation, Tr,  ~s a function of:
* the rate of growth of nominal wages, GWAGE.
*  the rate of devaluation  of the exchange rate plus the rate of international  inflation
GE + GP.
* the rate of growth of the money supply, GM.
*  the effect of supply and demand shocks comprised in v =  6VZZ  +6q/q.
13 This is an 'equilibrium' rate of inflation in the sense that it is consistent with
continuous equilibrium  in the goods and money markets.  Inflationary  expectations  are
assumed as given.
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Moreover, for condition of homogeneity  in the real aggregate demand and aggregate
supply functions, we have that a  + b + c  =  1.
The model could be extended  also to include also indexation  rules for wages and the
exchange rate and an accommodation  rule for the money supply (see Corbo and Solimano,
1991  and Bruno, 1992, for further elaboration  along that lines).
4. Econometric  Estimates.
In this section we present the main results of the estimaticn of inflation  equations
based on the specification  of equation (9) allowing for lags in the effects of the different
explanatory  variables. The sample runs from 1990(1) to 1992(11)  and uses monthly
16information.  The equation is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares for two price indices:  the
rate of change of the Consumer Price Index and the rate of change of the Producer Price
Index"4. As the product (or input) composition  of the two indices is different for producer
and consumer  prices we should iot expect to obtain the same coefficients for the explanatory
variables  of the model in the CPI and PPI equations.  In general, the CPI includes a larger
share of non-traded goods.  The appendix  provides more information on the construction  of
the right-hand  side variables in the estimation.
Consumer  Price Inflation.
Table 2 presents the estimates  of the model for the specification  using the rate of
change  of the CPI as explanatory variables for two versions of the model: one in which the
coefficients  are unconstrained and another in which the coefficients are constrained  to sum
one (homogeneity  condition).  A dummy variable is included to capture the special effects of
price liberalization  waves introduced in January-February 1990 and 1991.
In the unrestricted specification  both the exchange rate (adjusted for international
inflation)  and the rate of growth of nominal  wages are statistically significant  at 95 percent.
The coefficient  of the contemporary variable GE +GP  is between 0.34 and 0.38. The sum
of the coefficients  of that variable for the current and lagged month is over 0.9 in the
unrestricted  version. The coefficients  of the rate of growth of wages in the CPI equation  is
14  Simultaneity  problems are bound to be less important in the case of Hungary  as the
degree of wage indexation is low and the exchange rate and monetary policies  are not fully
accommodating. Moreover, the lack of valid instruments at monthly frequency precludes  the
estimadon  of the model by two Stages Least Squares or Instrumental Variables.
17about 0. 15-0.17. When the coefficients of wages of the current period and one and two
months lags are added-up the resulting coefficient  rises to 0.28 (Table 2, eqn. 1).
The coefficient  of current period money growth appears with the wrong sign.  The
sum of the coefficients  with one and two month lag is around 0.40-0.46 for the unrestricted
specifications.
Let us turn now to the estimation with the restrictioi, that the coefficients  sum one.
The parameter of  the exchange rate (plus foreign inflation)  variable lies in the range of 0.40
- 0.62 depending  upon the specification  and the number of lags included.  This value of the
coefficient  of the exchange rate shows that a 10 percent devaluation would produce an
increase in the CPI between 4 and 6.2 percent, ceteris paribus, say holding wages and money
fixed after the devaluation. The coefficient  of wages is between 0.20, (specification  with no
lags) and 0.23 wheii two lags are added up. The coefficient  of the sum of two months lagged
mo-ney  growth (MI) is between 0.40 (eqn. 4, table 2) and 0.44 for the specification
represented by (eqn. 7, table 2).
In general these results show that the exchange  rate (and foreign inflation)  has a
quantitatively  important impact on CPI inflation. Besides, this variable is the only one that is
statistically  significant  across different specifications.  Moreover, the impact of changes  in the
rate of growth of Ml  on CPI inflation is weak in the short term and operates with seveal
lags.'5 The rate of growth of wages also has an impact on CPI inflation though its
quantitative  importance  is not very large. These findings suggests that a policy of exchange
15 Unpublished  estimations conducted  at the National Bank of Hungary suggest that
changes in domestic credit have also a large impact on consumer prices.
18rate based-disinflation  is bound to have a bigger short-term impact on reducing inflation than
a strategy that relies only on reducing the rate of money growth.  These findings supports the
notion held by the NBH that the exchange rate nas a relatively large impact on domestic
prices and therefore it can be used as a nominal anchor for stabilization. However, further
research is needed to gauge the impact of the associated r1  exchange rate appreciation  (see
section 5) on exports and import flows and hence on the trade balance.
Producer Prices Inflation.
The estimation  of price equations using the producer price index, PPI, as dependent
vaiable  yields, in general, weak results and imprecise estimates (see Table 3).
In the unrestricted  specifications  (equations 1 and 2, table 3) only the sum of
exchange rate devaluation  plus foreign inflation is statistically significant  in the different
specifications.  The value of the coefficient for the current period value of GE+GP- is around
0.55  and the sum of the coefficients  for this variable plus two lags lie in the range of 0.71
and 0.79.  As these equations  show, the impact of exchange rate policy on the PPI is xizeable
and quicker than on the CPI given the former's larger share of traded goods." 6
The coefficient  of the rate of change of nominal wages in the PPI equation is very
small and statistically insignificant. The sum of the coefficients  of the rate of growth of MI
of the current and lagged periods is in the range of 0.33 and 0.39.
16 Estimations  conducted  at the NBH suggests that the full inflationary  impact of
exchange rate changes may take 3-4 quarters.
19It is worth noting that on impact, the effect of a change in the rate of devaluation  has
a greater impact on the rate of inflation measured by the PPI than the rate of inflation of the
CPI. This result is consistent with the lower rate of inflation of PPI than CPI observed in
Hungary in the last few years.
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To explore more systematically  different strategies of disinflation that are relevant for
Hungary, we use the estimates  of the model to simulate four types of disinflation options.
The options explored  contrast policies of money-based  stabilization  with exchange rate-based
stabilization  besides mixed strategies and an exchange-rate  policy oriented to keep the real
exchange rate constant in presence of inflation.
In general, the difference between exchange rate versus money-based  disinflation  lie
in the distribution over time of the costs of stabilization  and the transmission  mechanisms
through which the price level and output are affected by each stabilization  strategy.
In general, money-based  stabilization  tends, to generate a recession in the short term
as tight money  rise real interest rates and cut domestic  absorption.  Clearly, the costs of
disinflation are paid at the beginning  of the program.  In contrast, exchange rate-based
stabilization  programs may, in principle, avoid a recession or even produce an initial boom
in economic  activity (see Kiguel and Liviatan, 1992).  In fact, the usual pattem in an
exchange  rate-based stabilization  program is a fall in real interest rates and a real
appreciation  of the exchange rate because price inertia and wage stickiness.  If the real
interest rate effect dominates  a recessien can be avoided in the short-term.  However, the
real currency appreciation  in the medium run will have a recessionary effect as domestic
output becomes less competitive  in international markets. Thus, the costs of stabilization
tend to be postponed  over time in programs using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor.
23Regarding the effect  on the price level, a money-based  program acts, chiefly, by
creating slack that moderates  both wage increases in the labor market and price changes in
the goods market.
Moreover, in exchange rate-based  stabilization  programs, the nominal  exchange rate
exerts a moderate  effect on the price level though several channels: it reduces the rate of
increase in the domestic price of imported intermediate inputs, it slowdown  the rate of
increase of imported final goods (chiefly  consumption goods) and indirectly it reduces the
rate of growth of wages if they are indexed to the CPI."
Most of these effects are already included in our inflation model and are reflected in
the elasticities of aggregate demand and aggregate supply with respect to the money supply
and the exchange rate.  Our price estimates are thus function of those structural parameters.
The four strategies  of disinflation  that are simulated for the period 1991(1) to
1992(11)  are":
(1) A policy of fixing the nominal  exchange rate, GE=0 (Simulation  1).'9.  It is
assumed that this policy is crecible to the public and that is backed by a sufficient level of
international  reserves at the Central Bank.
17  See Dombusch (1986), Sachs and Larmain  (1993), ch. 15.
" The simulation starts on 1991(1) to take into account the period in which most basic
misalignment  in relative prices were corrected and the economy operated more or less under
a regime of free prices.
19 A simulation of this policy with a full macro-model would include the estimation of a
money demand equation  and also the capital account, sae Fischer (1984).  Alternatively,  it
could be assumed that the monetary  authorities sterilize any additional increase in the amount
nf monev  resultine from inflows of reserves.
24(2) A policy of reducing the rate of growth of MI  to 1 percent per month (Sim. 2).
(3) A combined policy of fixing the exchange rate and reducing the rate of growth of
the money supply to a rate of 1 percent per month, GE =0 and GM1 =  1 percent
(Sim.3) 2".
(4) A policy of devaluing the exchange  rate at a rate equal to the difference between
(last month) domestic and foreign inflation (Simulation  4).
These policies, in turn, are evaluated  in terms of two criteria (see tables 4 and 5):
. Velocity and magnitude  of disinflation.
• Impact on the real exchange rate.
This illustrates a basic dilemma  in stabilization  in open economies  that use the
exchange  rate as a nominal anchor for disinflationazy  purposes:  namely that disinflation
might be bought at the price of a real appreciation  of the exchange rate that affects external
competitiveness,  the development  of the export sector and possibly the attainment  of current
account  targets.
Simulation 1 amounts to a strategy  of exchange rate based stabilization,  simulation  2
is a strategy of money-based  stabilization  and Simulation 3 is a combination  of Simulations  i
and 2.  Simulation 4 amounts to a PPP (purchasing  power parity) rule seeking to maintain  a
constant  ra1  exchange rate. This last policy is oriented to preserve external balance and
promote exports rather than reduce inflation. Though, it is still worth exploring the
inflationary  implications of this policy.
20  This simulation assumes that the monetary authorities can impose restrictions  on
capital mobility  in order to delink domestic from international interest rates.
25Table 4 reports the results of the path of CPI inflation 21 associated with each of the
four policy simulations  just described.  Moreover, a base simulation is also presented using
the actual values of the right hand side variables of the model. The regression coefficients
used in the different simulations correspond  to equation  5 (restricted specification)  in table 2.
As it can be seen from table 4, the simulation  that combines a fixed nominal  exchange
rate with reduced money growth (sim. 3), is the one that yields the lowest inflation rat:  1
percent per month which amounts to an annualized  rate of 12.9 percent.  This implies  a
reduction  of near 10 percentage points of inflation  per year compared to the base simulation
(see bottom table 4).  In simulation I (fixed exchange rate) the monthly rate of CPI inflation
is 1.2 percent with an annual rate of 15.4 percent.  In turn, a policy of money-based
disinflation,  GM1 =  1  % per month, (simulation  2) yields a monthly rate of inflation  of 1.5
percent with a corresponding annual inflation rate of 19.8 percent.  Finally a PPP based
exchange  rate rule gives a rate of inflation  per year of 36 percent; substanially higher than
the inflation  rate associated with any other simulation, included the base simulation.  22
Table 5 shows the evolution of the real exchange rate, defined as EP/P,  associated
with each simulation. The results show that the degree of real exchange appreciation  is
greater for the policy of fixing the exchange (simulation 1) than for any other policy
simulation. In simulation 1 (exchange rate-based  clisinflation)  the cumulative  real
appreciation  from 199  1(1) to 1992(11)  is 24.3 percent and in simulation  2 (money-based
21 Since the estimates for PPI were rather unstable we preferred to simulate the effects of
the different  policy rules on CPI inflation.
22  The question of what price index to use when pursuing a PPP rule is not trivial,
particularly  when the rate of inflation of various indices are relatively different, as is the case
in Hungary. Here the CPI is used as indexer for consistency to obtain dynamic simulations
since the CPI equation is more stable than the PPI equation.
26stabilization)  the cumuladve appreciation is 16.4 percent.  As it could be expected the policy
of PPP rule is the only rule consistent with a constant real exchange rate at the end of the
simulation  period.'
Clearly, the simulations  illustrate the orders of magnitude  of the implicit trade-off
between using the exchange rate for anti-inflationary  purposes (simulation 1 and 3) instead of
gearing it to smi exchange rate targets (simulation  4).  When the exchange rate is used for
stabilization  the disinflation is quicker but it is accompanied  by a larger  real appreciation  of
the currency.  In contrast, a PPP rule avoids a real appreciation  and maintains  a stable real
exchange  rate under (moderate)  rate of price level increases, though, at the same time, it
introdiuces  an 'inflationary bias5 in the system through a policy of persistent devaluatione 4
3  Since these are counterfactual  simulations, we implicitly assume the absence of any
=LI shock (terms of trade, productivity)  during the simulation period that would call for an
adjustment  of the real exchange rate.
24 In this .nod1e  we have not included explicitly the existence of wage inclexation  to the
CPI.  In that case, the inflationary  impact of a PPP rule or any change in the rate of
devaluation  or in the level of the nominal  exchange rate would be larger since it would  entail
also an acceleration  in the rate of growth of nominal wages.
27TABLE 4
HUNGARY. INFLATION  RATE
UNDER ALTERNATIVE  EXCHANGE  RATE
AND  MONETARY  RULES
CPI Inflation
Baa  SIM.1  SIM.2  SIM.3  SIM.4
1991.01  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7
1991.02  4.9  5.5  4.8  5.4  8.2
1991.03  1.2  012  1.2  0.3  4.1
1991.04  1.6  0.9  1.6  0.8  3.3
1991.05  1.5  0.8  1.1  0.4  2.9
1991.06  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.3  1.7
1991.07  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.7  2.0
1991.08  .0.4  -0.9  -0.5  -0.9  1.0
1991.09  1.9  1.2  1.9  1.2  1.2
1991.10  1.1  0.4  1.1  0.4  2.0
1991.11  4.5  3.8  3.9  3.2  2.4
1991.12  2.1  2.0  0.6  0.5  2.6
1992.01  40.6  -0.7  -0.0  40.1  0.6
1992.02  0.9  0.3  1.0  0.4  2.7
1M.03  3.6  1.1  3.5  1.0  4.S
1992.04  0.8  1.3  0.5  0.9  1.3
1992.05  0.5  0.3  0.5  0.3  1.2
i992.06  1.3  0.8  0.9  0.4  2.0
192.07  2.8  2.0  2.4  1.6  1.7
1992.08  -0.7  -0.3  -1.1  -0.7  0.4
1992.09  0.9  0.5  0.8  0.4  1.2
1992.10  0.3  -0.0  0.3  -0.0  2.0
1992.11  2.7  0.5  2.4  0.2  4.3
Monthly inflation  1.7  1.2  1.5  1.0  2.6
ntte (ar  nage  percent)
Annualized
inflation rate  22.5  15.4  19.8  12.9  36.0
(percent)
28TABLE 5
HUNGARY.  REAL EXCHANGE  RATE UNDER ALTERNAITIVE
EXCHANGE  RATE AND MONETARY  RULES
BASE  SIMULl  SIMUL2  SIMUL3  SIMUL4
1991.01  100.00  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
1991.02  97.2  94.4  97.5  94.7  98.1
1991.03  96.5  93.8  96.4  93.9  99.6
1991.04  93.2  93.0  95.6  93.2  101.2
1991.0S  93.4  91.9  94.6  9?.9  101.0
1991.06  93.0  91.7  94.1  92.6  102.5
1991.07  90.7  90.7  93.8  92.2  102.7
1991.08  90.3  90.2  92.8  91.8  101.9
1991.09  89.3  90.0  92.2  91.5  104.0
1991.10  88.8  89.8  91.2  91.4  103.1
1991.11  88.3  86.0  91.7  88.6  101.6
1991.12  88.8  82.4  91.6  87.7  99.1
1992.01  91.5  83.1  91.2  87.3  102.3
1992.02  87.2  83.2  90.3  87.1  103.4
I992.03  83.6  82.2  88.3  86.2  101.2
992.04  85.0  d0.9  88.7  85.5  102.3
i992.0S  84.7  80.6  88.2  85.2  103.0
1992.06  82.7  79.5  87.6  84.7  102.4
1992.07  83.0  77.4  87.4  83.1  101.4
1992.08  84.4  77.1  87.0  83.4  102.2
1992.09  83.0  76.5  86.4  82.9  102.7
1992.10  81.3  76.4  85.8  82.8  103.2
1992.11  77.2  75.7  83.6  82.5  100.8
29FIGURE  3
HUNGARY:  CONSUMER  PRICE  INDEX
(Simulated  values  under  altemative  stabilization  strategies)
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HUNGARY:  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE
(Simulated  values under  altemative  stabilization  strategies)
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316. Concluding  Remarks
This paper has explored, empirically, the inflationary process in Hungary, and
provided econometric estimates  of the determinants of CPI and PPI inflation for the period
1990-1992  using monthly data.  The empirical estimates  of price equations -both  CPI and
PPI-  show the quantitative  importance  and statistical significance  of the exchange rate in the
process of price formation in Hungary during the period of intensification  of reforms (price
liberalization  while the economy  becme  more open to international trade of final goods and
inputs).  Our estimates show that the money supply affects consumer and producer prices
with several lags and its impact on prices is small in the short run.  Moreover, nominal
wages have a more significant  effect on the CPI than on the PPI.
The paper presents illustrative  policy simulations of alternative rules for the exchange
rate and the money supply  in terms of their impact on the rate of inflation and the level of
the real exchange rate.  It is found that a rule of fixing the exchange  te entails a lower
level of CPI inflation -some 5 percentage points of less CPI inflation per year--than a rule
based on reducing the rate of money  growth (to 1 percent per month).  However, a fixed
exchange ate policy is associated  with a larger appreciation of the real exchange rate than a
policy of money based disinflation-nearly 4 percentage points more of real appreciation  per
year.  In tum, a PPP based exchange rate rule stabilizes the real exchange  rate at the cost of
a substantial  acceleration  in inflation.
In this way, these exercises illustrate the nature and magnitude  of the trade-offs
between faster disinflation  and the level of external competitiveness  in an open economy  like
Hungary that uses the exchange rate as a nominal anchor in disinflation.
32Areas of further policy interest that require more analysis in the future refer to the
causality between real appreciation  and capital inflows, the process of wage formation  in the
transition  period and the channels through  which changes in the real exchange rate affect
trade flows, spending and output.
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35Ammwdix
Construction  of the Variables
GPPI  Rate of change in the Producer Price Index.
Source: Cental  Statistical  Office.
GCPI  Rate of change in the Consumer  Price Index.
Source: Centa  Statistical  Office.
GE  Rat  of change  of L%a  exchanp mte.
Mhe  exchange rate is a weighted  average index constructed as:
(0.5) 0 Fotint/USS +  (0.5) * Forint/ ECU. Source: Nadonal Bank of
Hungary.
GP  Ratc of change of the index of wholesale prices of Hungary's main triding
partners.  Source: National Bank of Hungary.
GMI  Rate of change in the stock of currency outside banks, enterprise deposits,
household  deposits, and other liquid deposits.  Source: National Bank of Hungary.
GWAGE Rate of change in the index of average manufacturing  wages.  Source  Cental
Statistical Office.
DUMMY The dummy variable equals I in January and February of 1990 and 1991.
For all other months it equals zero.
The indices, are escalated to December 1990 =  100.
All the series are monthly data collected from the Hungarian Cental  Statistical Office and
the National Bank of Hungary.  However, prior to 1992, wage data was only on a quarterly
basis.  We have interpolated the quarterly wage data through December 1991 to get monthly
wage series for the pre-1992 perod.
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